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We suggest that real collars may be an acceptable incentive for encouraging development of low 
(or no) carbon energy generating facilities as an alternative for high feed-in-tariffs. Composed of 
pairs of put and call American perpetuity options, feasible collars perform a similar role as 
subsidies by raising the value of an energy generator. We provide novel analytical solutions for 
real collars and partial collars, plus floor and ceiling partial derivatives. The “gains/losses” of the 
energy generator as perceived parameter values change are compared to those of the government 
providing the collar, and floor or ceiling only, viewing the arrangement as a real option game 
between principal and agent. A volatility increase first increases, then decreases the “gains” of 







We present a collar option as a suitable policy device for a government (GOV) providing a 
subsidy for a private energy generator (GEN) by guaranteeing a floor in the face of adverse 
circumstances, and simultaneously capturing abnormally high returns when the circumstances 
are sufficiently favorable.  The analysis of collars adopts a real option formulation because the 
guarantee on the downside and bonus compensation for the government on the upside are 
expressible as real options.  Using an American perpetuity model, a minimum price guarantee 
(with a high ceiling) can create a value equivalent to a high feed-in-tariff which has often been 
used in the UK.  
The National Audit Office (2016, 2017) states that the Hinkley Point C Arrangement (HPCA) 
involves a subsidy to the state supported EDF and CGN entities of a present value of some 30 
billion pounds, as the difference between the feed-in-tariff (92.5 pounds per MWhr in 2012 
prices) and the current UK electricity price as of March 2016.    Possible benefits for the U.K. 
government in the HPCA are reductions in the feed-in-tariff for electricity if construction costs 
are below expected levels, and a payment to the GOV if eventually the project IRR exceeds 
specified levels.  The National Audit Office (2017) does not investigate the incentives for the 
GEN to control construction costs, or to operate just short of the level that triggers an upside call 
option1, or to reduce the project volatility by hedging or issuing electricity price risk sharing debt 
instruments. An alternative collar with a guaranteed electricity price at or below the current UK 
electricity price could provide equivalent value for the nuclear GEN2. 
There is a vast literature on subsidies used to promote certain types of energy facilities, which 
Couture and Gagnon (2009) separate into market independent (feed-in-tariffs) and market 
dependent categories.  One market independent subsidy cited is the Spanish 2007 “variable 
premium” that involves a type of floor and cap, where the highest premium (over the market 
electricity price) is paid when the electricity price is low, and zero when the price exceeds a 
                                                             
1 The Hinkley Point C agreement, expected to operate for 60 years, specifies that the GOV (on behalf of UK 
electricity customers) may recover some of the construction costs less than the expected amounts, and obtain a 
payment from the GEN if the IRR on the project turns out to be more than 11.4%. The concessionaire is owned by 
Électricité de France (EDF) and China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN). 
2 A case study showing that the approximate value of the current FiT for HPCA might be replicated by a suitable 
floor and ceiling is available from the authors. 
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ceiling (so the GEN receives all of the higher price, without  a premium).    González (2009) 
provides some detail on these premium collars, which were (€ cents/kWh) 25.4-34.4 for solar, 
7.3-8.5 for small on-shore wind, and 15.4-16.6 for energy crops in 2007.  Meira et al. (2008) 
illustrates how this system worked for wind power during 2006.  Brandão and Saraiva (2008) 
and Shan et al. (2010) propose that government guarantees for infrastructure projects should 
involve a European collar.  Fernandes et al. (2015) suggest a collar-type insurance for wind 
power in Brazil, where the generator has promised to supply power even during times where 
there is little wind.  Except for European collars, these authors do not propose analytical 
solutions for these long-life collar arrangements. 
There are some analytical studies for perpetual subsidies (Boomsma and Linnerud, 2015, Adkins 
and Paxson, 2015), and for perpetual floors/ceilings. Takashima et al. (2010) design a private-
public partnership (PPP) deal involving government debt participation that incorporates a floor 
on the future maximum loss level where the investor has the right to sell back the project 
whenever adverse conditions emerge. Armada et al. (2012) make an analytical comparison of 
various subsidy policies including minimum revenue guarantees.   
Several authors focus on the conflict between a principal GOV and agent concessionaire GEN 
implicit in contracts.  Chevalier-Roignant et al. (2011) and Azevedo and Paxson (2014) survey 
many real option game problems between principal and agent.  Scandizzo and Ventura (2010) 
focus on “calculating a baseline to organize a concession contract…to measure the balance of 
power between the public and the private party”. 
Our contribution consists of analytical models for a post-investment (ACTIVE) collar, so the 
costs and benefits to the GEN and GOV can be clearly identified, initially and as the parameter 
values evolve over time.  Also, it is easy to see what initial parameter values the GEN and GOV 
are likely to over (under) estimate or emphasize, and what basic incentives are evident for the 
two parties to a subsidized energy facility arrangement.  The basic game theory applicable to a 
principal and an agent is that the incentives for the agent should be allied to the objectives of the 
principal, and that the principal monitors periodically the performance of the agent to see 
whether those objectives are being met. 
This paper is organized in the following way. In the next section, we formulate the collar model 
analytically, along with floor only and ceiling only models. In section 3, we show the analytical 
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partial derivatives of the calls and puts with respect to changing the floor/ceiling, perhaps useful 
for both parties in negotiating a satisfactory arrangement. In section 4, further insights are gained 
from performing a numerical sensitivity analysis. Section 5 presents some of the more interesting 
aspects of “who wins, who loses, why” between the GEN and GOV as parameter values change. 
The versatility of the analytical representation is demonstrated in section 6 through an extension 
to partial collars. Section 7 is a conclusion.  
2 Fundamental Models 
For a firm in a monopolistic situation confronting a sole source of uncertainty due to output 
price3 variability, and ignoring operating costs and taxes, the operation of an energy generator 
depends primarily (or solely) on the electricity price evolution, which is specified by the 
geometric Brownian motion process4: 
 d d dP P t P Wα σ= +   (1) 
where α  denotes the expected price risk-neutral drift, σ  the price volatility, and dW  an 
increment of the standard Wiener process. Using contingent claims analysis, the option to 





F FP r P rF
P P
σ δ∂ ∂+ − − =
∂ ∂
  (2) 
where r α>  denotes the risk-free interest rate and rδ α= −  thee convenience yield or the rate 
of return shortfall. The generic solution to (2) is: 
 ( ) 1 21 2F P A P A Pβ β= +   (3) 
where 1 2,A A  are to be determined generic constants for calls and puts, and 1 2,β β  are, 
respectively, the positive and negative roots of the fundamental equation, which are given by: 
                                                             
3 This assumption is perhaps more valid for nuclear power, which operates at a constant baseload except for some 
planned (and also emergency) outages.  This model can easily be altered to involve quantity (Q) uncertainty where 
R=P*Q. However, our analysis assumes Q is ignored, but the original construction cost is expressed in terms of unit 
capacity for Q. 
4Tests for whether gBm process is appropriate for UK monthly baseload electricity prices are available from the 
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In (3), if 2 0A =  then F is a continuously increasing function of P  and represents an American 
perpetual call option, Samuelson (1965), while if 1 0A =  then F is a decreasing function and 
represents a put option, Merton (1973) and Merton (1990).  
 
2.1 Real Collar Option for an ACTIVE Project 
 
A collar option is designed to confine the output price for an active project to a tailored range, by 
restricting its value to lie between a floor LP  and a cap HP . Whenever the price trajectory falls 
below the floor, the received output price is assigned the value LP , and whenever it exceeds the 
cap, it is assigned the value HP . By restricting the price to this range, the firm benefits from 
receiving a price that never falls below LP  and obtains protection against adverse price 
movements, whilst at the same time, it is being forced never to receive a price exceeding HP , and 
so sacrifices the upside potential. For an active project, the revenue accruing to the firm is given 
by ( ) { }{ }min max , ,C L HP P P P Qπ = ×  (we assume Q=1) and its value CV  is described by the 
risk-neutral valuation relationship: 






V VP r P rV P
P P
σ δ π∂ ∂+ − − + =
∂ ∂
.  (5) 
The valuation of a with-collar active project is conceived over three mutually exclusive 
exhaustive regimes, I, II and III, specified on the P  line, each with its own distinct valuation 
function. Regimes I, II and III are defined by ,LP P≤ L HP P P< <  and HP P≤ , respectively.  
Over Regime I, the firm is granted a more attractive fixed price LP  compared with the variable 
price P , but also possesses a call-style option to switch to the more favorable Regime II as soon 
as P  exceeds LP . This switch option increases in value with P  and has the generic form 1APβ , 
where A  denotes a to be determined generic coefficient. Over Regime III, the firm is not only 
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obliged to accept the less attractive fixed price HP  instead of P  but also has to sell a put-style 
option to switch to the less favorable Regime II as soon as P  falls below HP . This switch option 
decreases in value with P  and has the generic form 2APβ . Over Regime II, the firm receives the 
variable price P , possesses a put-style option to switch to the more favorable Regime I as soon 
as P  falls to LP , but sells a call-style option to switch to the less favorable Regime III as soon as 
P  attains HP . The various switch options are displayed in Table 1, where A  denotes a generic 
coefficient. 
Table 1: The Various Switch Options 
 
From – To Option Type Value Sign of A  
I – II Call 1APβ  + 
II – I Put 2APβ  + 
II – III Call 1APβ  - 
III – II Put 2APβ  - 
 
If the subscript C  denotes the with-collar arrangement, then after paying the investment cost, the 
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  (6) 
 
In (6), the first numerical subscript for a coefficient denotes the regime { }1 ,2 ,3I II III= = = , 
while the second denotes a call if 1 or a put if 2. The coefficients 11 22,C CA A  are expected to be 
positive because the firm owns the options and a switch is beneficial. In contrast, 21 32,C CA A  are 
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expected to be negative because the firm is writing the options and is being penalized by the 
switch. The real collar is composed of a pair of both call and put options. The first pair facilitates 
switching back and forth between Regime I and II, which results in an advantage for the GEN, 
while the second pair facilitates switching back and forth between Regime II and III, which 
results in a disadvantage for the firm. The real collar design differs from the typical European 
collar, which only involves buying and selling two distinct options. 
 
A switch in either direction between Regime I and II occurs when LP P= . It is optimal provided 
the value-matching relationship: 
 1 1 211 21 22L C C C




+ = + +   (7) 
 
and its smooth-pasting condition5 expressed as: 
 1 1 21 11 1 21 2 22C C C
PA P A P A Pβ β ββ β β
δ
= + +   (8) 
 
both hold when evaluated at LP P= . Similarly, a switch in either direction between Regime II 
and III occurs when HP P= . It is optimal provided the value-matching relationship: 
 1 2 221 22 32HC C C




+ + = +   (9) 
and its smooth-pasting condition expressed as: 
 1 2 21 21 2 22 2 32C C C
P A P A P A Pβ β ββ β β
δ
+ + =   (10) 
 
both hold when evaluated at HP P= .  A novel expression for the option coefficients is: 
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The signs of the four option coefficients comply with expectations. Other findings can also be 
derived. The coefficient 22CA  for the option to switch from Regime II to I, which depends on 
only LP  and not on HP , increases in size with LP . This switch option becomes more valuable for 
the firm as the floor level increases. Similarly, the coefficient 21CA  for the option to switch from 
Regime II to III, which depends on only HP  and not on LP , decreases in magnitude with HP . 
This switch option becomes less valuable for the government as the cap level increases. The 
coefficients 11CA  and 32CA  for the switch option from Regime I to II and from Regime III to II, 
respectively, depend on both LP  and HP . 
2.2 Floor and Cap Options 
The analogous results for the floor only and the cap (ceiling) only are shown below. 
Price Floor Model 
We use the additional subscript f  to indicate a model with only a floor. From (6) the active 
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A high floor is favorable for the firm, and so represents a government granted subsidy, Armada 
et al. (2012). 
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Price Cap Model 
We use the additional subscript c  to indicate a model with only a cap. From (6) the active 
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  ( 14) 
with: 
 
( ) ( )1 2
2 2 1 1
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P r P rβ β
β δβ β δβ
β β δ β β δ
− − − −
= ≤ = ≤
− −
. ( 15) 
A ceiling is less desirable for the GEN than an operation without a cap, and consequently it is 
imposed by, for example, a government intent on offering a subsidy but shielding electricity 
customers against escalating prices. 
3 Collar and Floor and Ceiling Partial Derivatives 
 
Calculating the partial derivatives of the option coefficients with respect to changes in the floor 
or ceiling is novel, and perhaps enables each contracting party to view clearly the impact of 
different floor and/or ceiling levels on the real collar arrangement.  The more traditional deltas 
(partial derivatives of the option coefficients and value of the floor or ceiling), and gammas 
(second derivative of the option coefficients and value of the floor or ceiling) are used to show 
that indeed the original ODE is solved, see Table 2.  
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            (18) 
One reason for calculating the collar, and floor and ceiling “deltas”, is to provide an analytical 
framework for viewing the price exposure of a generator with a collar, compared to without a 
collar, and for displaying the significance of a proposed floor or ceiling on the value of option 
elements in any GOV and GEN arrangement. 
4. Numerical Illustrations 
 
Although the analytical results reveal some interesting properties, further insights into model 
behavior are obtainable from numerical evaluations. The base case parameter values are Q=1, 
σ=25%, r=4%, and δ=4%. The evaluated power parameters for these values are 1 1.7369β =  and 
2 0.7369β = −  from (4).  The basic spreadsheet is Table 2, with the base case parameter values, 
which show that the option coefficient signs are as expected and that the ODE (5) is solved using 




In Table 3 the evaluated switch option coefficients, 11 21 22 32, , ,C C C CA A A A  are shown in Panels A-
D, respectively, for various floor and cap levels. The floor levels are chosen to vary between a 
minimum 0LP =  and a maximum 4LP = , and the cap levels between a minimum 10HP = ,  and 
a maximum HP = ∞ . As expected, all the four coefficients adopt the correct sign, 21CA  is 
independent of LP  and 22CA  of HP , while 11 32,C CA A  depend on both. Further, 11CA , the 
coefficient for the option to switch from Regime I to II, decreases with LP  but increases with HP
, since for any feasible Regime I price level, the switch option is more valuable for lower LP  
levels because of the time value of money and that the price level is closer to LP , and for higher 
HP  levels because less is being sacrificed. Similarly, 32CA , the negative coefficient for the option 
to switch from Regime III to II increases in magnitude with HP  because of the time value of 
money and decreases with LP  because less is being sacrificed. Finally,  21CA , the negative 
coefficient for the option to switch from Regime II to III decreases in magnitude with HP  
because less is being sacrificed at higher HP  levels, while 22CA , the coefficient for the option to 
switch from Regime II to I increases with LP  because more is being gained for higher LP  levels. 
Note that the coefficients for the price floor are also available from Table 3 in the rows where 
HP = ∞ , while those for the price cap model are available from the columns where 0LP = . 
***Tables 2 & 3 about here*** 
The cost of the subsidy can be neutralized and the collar made “costless” by suitably engineering 
its floor and cap levels. For the ACTIVE GEN, a “costless collar” might be obtained equating the 
written call and protective put 1 221 22,   for C C L HA P A P P P P
β β < < .  For instance, for base case 
parameter values when P=6, PL=4, PH=15.6,  1 221 22 .C CA P A P
β β− =  Some illustrative “costless” 
LP  and HP  pairs are presented in Table 4. The pairs are inversely related, as expected, since for 
the collar to remain “costless”, any increase in the floor and reduction in downside risk has to be 
compensated by an additional sacrifice of the upside potential. 
***Table 4 about here*** 
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4.1 Changes in Price 
Figure 1 shows that the collar value VC (6) exceeds the PV, left hand terms of (6) when P is low, 
VC and VC PV are equal when P=6, since the floor and ceiling are designed as costless collars at 
P=6 and the other base case parameter values, VC<VC PV when P>6 as the option coefficients 
AC21 and AC22 decrease as P approaches and then exceeds PH. 
*** Figure 1 about here *** 
4.2 Changes in Volatility 
Figure 2 shows that the VC first slightly exceeds VC PV as price volatility increases from nearly 
zero, but then falls short of the VC PV as volatility increases beyond 25%, which is the base case 
where AC21=-AC22, a costless collar.  The GEN has an incentive to hedge against increased 
volatility, but should welcome volatility slightly lower than 25%. 
*** Figure 2 about here *** 
4.3 Changes in Interest Rate 
Figure 3 shows that the VC collar is somewhat less valuable as the interest rate increases past the 
base case rate of 4%.  The held put option becomes less valuable at high interest rates, and the 
negative written call option value much more negative as r>4%.   
*** Figure 3 about here *** 
4.4  Changes in Yield 
Figure 4 shows that the PV is significantly affected by changes in the yield, since between the 
floor and ceiling cash flows are valued dividing by the yield.  From a costless collar when δ=4%, 
the written call option increases much more than the held put option decreases when δ falls, but 
the PV of P increases, so in theory the GEN should favor yield decreases.  Perhaps the 
interpretation that δ represents the convenience yield derived from the term structure of 
electricity futures prices implies that δ is exogeneous, so the GEN observes rather than 
influences δ.  Alternatively, perhaps this figure shows one of the limitations of the basic model. 
*** Figure 4 about here *** 
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5. Risk Sharing: Who Wins, Who Loses, Why? 
In the principal-agent problem (GOV-GEN) and risk-sharing aspects of collar and floor or 
ceiling only arrangements, who wins, and who loses, as parameter values change are likely to be 
the indicators for GEN versus GOV incentives after the initial transaction.  Initially, it is 
assumed that the GEN pays the “fair value” of the facility arrangement to the GOV, and the 
construction cost has already been paid by the GOV.   In the base case, we also assume that the 
GOV has offered the GEN a “costless” real collar arrangement, where the value of a call written 
by the GEN to the GOV on upside prices higher than the ceiling PH and a put written by the 
GOV to the GEN on downside prices lower than a floor PL are equal and initially PL<P<PH.  It is 
assumed that both the GEN and the GOV agree on the initial and subsequent perceived 
parameter values, which is perhaps a heroic assumption. Disagreements and different views 
would produce different results and interpretations6.  The effect of changes in the parameter 
values are zero-sum games, where the GEN gain/loss is equal to the GOV loss/gain, so that the 
GEN plus GOV is zero.  Generally, the figures below confirm the previous figures on sensitivity, 
but are stated in an alternative format. 
We show here six examples of GEN versus GOV results, as parameter values change.  In Figure 
5, from an initial “costless” collar if PL=4 and PH =15.6 and P=6, if P increases, the GEN gains 
and GOV loses relatively in a zero-sum game. 
*** Figure 5 about here *** 
In Figure 6a, from an initial volatility of 25% when P=6, if volatility increases, in a zero-sum 
game (where the benefits and costs change,  but remain equal to each other with opposite signs) 
the GEN suffers from the negative call increasing more than the put, and GOV benefits.  If 
volatility decreases from 25%, GEN benefits from the negative call decreasing less than the put, 
but when the volatility is close to zero, neither is of any value, thereby reverting to a costless 
collar. 
                                                             
6 If the floor and ceiling are based on observable monthly average electricity prices, conceivably an independent 
third party could verify the price barriers as specified in any legal arrangement.  However, different views of 
expected future price volatilities and convenience yields over several years could lead to both parties simultaneously 
justifying gains or losses using these real option models, hardly a zero-sum game. 
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These volatility (vega) patterns are dependent on the level of P relative to PL and PH. When P=2, 
given the basic collar arrangement, the GOV gains when AC11 falls as volatility decreases below 
25% as shown in Figure 6b. The opposite occurs when P=18, given the basic collar arrangement, 
the GOV gains when -AC32 falls as volatility increases above 25% as shown in Figure 6c.  As in 
Figure 2 the GEN is typically hurt by high volatility, which is not intuitive.  
*** Figures 6a, 6b and 6c about here *** 
In Figure 7, GEN loses if the interest rate rises above 4%, and the GOV gains, showing perhaps 
that in the current low interest rate environment, previous collar arrangements are not necessarily 
good for investors, unless they have issued fixed rate long term debt without mandatory 
redemptions.  It is hard to imagine a GOV benefitting or losing from a change in interest rates, 
since the basic interest rate is an economic policy instrument, and most GOVs have a mix of 
short and long-term debt, including pension and medical expense obligations. 
*** Figure 7 about here ** *  
In Figure 8, suppose that δ represents the convenience yield derived from electricity futures, so a 
low δ implies a nearly flat term structure of future prices.  If current futures forecast future 
prices, that is hardly beneficial for the GEN who benefits from higher P especially when 
PL<P<PH, even though the effect on increasing the PV of the price maybe beneficial for the 
GEN.  The so-called asset yield, dividend, or convenience yield, or return “shortfall” is a 
difficult concept to interpret in most applications, illustrated in this case.   
*** Figure 8 about here ** *  
It is interesting to compare collar arrangements with different floors and ceilings, and with floor 
only or ceiling only arrangements.  Figure 9 shows the risk sharing collar arrangements between 
GEN and GOV as a function of various levels of the floor. It is natural that the GEN benefits 
(and the GOV suffers) from higher floors, in a zero-sum game.  
*** Figures 9 and 10 about here ** *  
Equally dramatic in a zero-sum game is the effect of changes in price volatility on risk sharing 
when there is only a floor, or alternatively only a ceiling.  Figure 10 shows the risk allocation 
with a floor only as a function of P volatility, but with the GEN benefit increasing with volatility 
16 
 
up to a certain point (about 45%), when thereafter volatility increases result in a decline of the 
GEN benefit, in contrast to Figures 6a and 6b for a collar.  
6 Partial Collars 
We now consider an additional illustrative case to investigate whether the findings for the plain 
vanilla collar formulation concerning the nature of the option coefficients extend to more 
complicated collar designs. We increase the number of regimes and formulate the shared revenue 
for the outer regimes of the collar to depend on a proportion (less than 100%) of the revenue 
under the floors and over the ceilings. Our findings for this extension demonstrate that an 
analytical solution is obtainable despite the increase in complexity.  Some of the sensitivities to 
changes in parameter values are similar to the previous collar model, but some are surprising. 
The notation we use in this section are specific, except that 1β  and 2β  are specified by (4). 
Shaoul et al. (2012) report that for a U.K. rail franchise agreement, investors are reimbursed for 
50% of any revenue shortfall below 98% of forecast and 80% below 96%, but suffer a claw-back 
of 50% of revenue exceeding 102%, equivalent to partial puts and calls. The Hinkley Point C 
arrangement specifies that if the project IRR exceeds 11.4% in nominal terms, the gain is shared 
30:70 between the GOV and the GEN, and 60:40 if the IRR exceeds 13.5% in nominal terms and 
11.5% in real terms.   
We suppose there is a symmetrical arrangement with two downside risk sharing and two upside 
risk sharing arrangements. The actual price for an output is denoted by P. For the purpose of 
determining the price to be received by the GEN, the agreement with the government divides the 
price schedule into 5 distinct exhaustive regimes.  The four junctions for neighboring regimes 
occur at LLP P= , where LLP  represents the lowest limit, at LP P=  where LP  is the lower limit,  
at HP P=  where HP  is the higher limit, and at HHP P=  where HHP  is the highest limit. Under 
Regime I with LLP P< , the “price received” by the GEN is the actual price P  plus a proportion 
1 LLw−  of the shortfall below LLP and a proportion 1 Lw− of the difference (PL-PLL).  Under 
Regime II with LL LP P P≤ < , the price received is P  plus a proportion 1 Lw−  of the shortfall 
from PL, where 0 1LL Lw w≤ ≤ ≤ . Under Regime III with L HP P P≤ < , the price received is P , 
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and under Regime IV with H HHP P P≤ < , the price received is P  less a proportion 1 Hw−  of 
( )HP P− . Under Regime V with HHP P≥ , the price received is P  less a proportion 1 HHw−  of  
(P-PHH) and less a proportion 1 Hw−  of (PHH-PH), where 0 1HH Hw w≤ < ≤ . In the absence of any 
fixed costs and taxation, the regime value is determined not only from the price schedule but also 
from the presence of any switch options.  
For each regime, if there exist opportunities for switching to an higher or lower neighboring 
regime, then these are represented by options, a call-style option for upward switching and a put-
style option for downward switching, so both Regime II , III and IV are characterized by both 
call and put options, while Regime I by a call and Regime V by a put. Also, a switch producing a 
price advantage is represented by a positive option value coefficient, while that for a price 
disadvantage by a negative coefficient. The specification and associated price values for each of 
the five regimes are listed in Table 5. 
Table 5  Regime Specification and Price Schedule  
Regime Specification Value 
I LLP P<   ( )
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The eight unknown switch option coefficients, 11 21 22 31 32 41 42 52, , , , , , ,A A A A A A A A , are determined 
from the value matching relationships and associated smooth pasting conditions. The value 
matching relationships, defined at each of the 4 junctions of neighboring regimes are: 
 ( ) ( ) 0
LL
II I P P
V P V P
=
− =     (19) 
 ( ) ( ) 0
L
III II P P
V P V P
=
− =     (20) 
 ( ) ( ) 0
H
IV III P P
V P V P
=
− =    (21) 
 ( ) ( ) 0
HH
V IV P P
V P V P
=
− =      (22) 
Equations (19)-(22) together with the 4 associated smooth pasting conditions are sufficient to 
solve for the unknowns. The resulting solutions together with their signs are presented in Table 
6. The coefficients having a positive value indicate that the corresponding switch options are 
owned by the GEN and contribute to their value, whilst those having a negative sign are sold or 
written.      Table 6 
Solutions and Conditions for the Switch Option Coefficients Partial Collar Model 
Coefficient Solution Condition 
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The ACTIVE partial collars have somewhat different sensitivities to changes in P and P volatility 
than the previous “full” collars7. Partial collars with the parameter values the same as Table 2, 
except the layers, designed so the VC value is about the same (VC=138) as the basic result, are 
floors 3.5,4, and ceilings 10, 10.5, and the risk sharing is .25, .5 on the downside and .5, .25 on 
the upside.  Figure 11 shows a decreasing sensitivity to increases in P, which is intuitive 
compared to 100% risk sharing below the floor and above the ceiling. [While not exactly 
comparable due to the different ceiling, the value of a partial collar increases 96% and a full 
collar 76% as P goes from 6 to 18.]  
The sensitivity of partial collar to changes in P volatility (“vegas”) are slightly different, with the 
VC partial collar also decreasing as volatility increases, as Figure 12 shows with P=6  but with 
P=2 and P=18 below the figure. 
***Figures 11 and 12 about here *** 
How does the particular collar setting affect the exposure of a GEN to changes in prices, which is 
a critical risk consideration?  Without a collar, the price exposure (delta) is of course simply 1/δ, 
or the LHS term of (6).   With a collar, the price exposure is the middle row of (16). When P=6, 
Figure 13 shows that the ACTIVE project with a collar becomes less sensitive to changes in P as 
the floor increases, but the floor delta from the middle row of (17) becomes more important as 
the floor increases. 
***Figure 13 about here *** 
                                                             




In a mainly analytical way, the properties of a plain vanilla collar, made up of a floor and cap, 
are investigated for an active asset using a real option formulation. The collar is composed of 
pairs of American perpetuity put and call options that confine a focal variable, such as revenue, 
price or volume, to a designated field specified by the floor and cap.  
The role of the cap is to mitigate the cost to the government of guaranteeing a floor, and thereby 
inhibits the spread of any allegations of being over-generous.  Governments can even create a 
“costless” collar by selecting a floor to induce investment and a cap that neutralizes the 
additional value it creates.  
We provide novel analytical solutions for collars (11), floors only (13), ceilings only (15), floor 
(17) and ceiling deltas (18), and partial collars (Tables 5 and 6).   In negotiating the original 
terms, it is critical for the GEN to focus on how the project value is sensitive to input changes, 
shown in Figures 1 to 4.   Another use of these analytical expressions is to identify clearly the 
gains and losses for a principal (GOV) and agent (GEN) participating in an energy generating 
facility as parameter values change, shown in Figures 5 to 9.  Different real option games are 
envisioned, where changes in some of the parameter values after an initial deal result in a zero-
sum game.  This basic framework may be useful in viewing the intended consequences of 
different appropriate arrangements, and in identifying incentives for the agent in operating a 
generating facility.   
The primary numerical finding is that the GEN and GOV have contrasting “vegas” that is 
sensitivities to changes in perceived future price volatility, with generally the GEN hurt by high 
volatilities after the initial “fair” deal (Figures 2 and 6 a,b,c).  Layered collars, and less than 
100% risk sharing under the floors and over the ceilings expose the GEN less to changes in price 
(Figure 11) and price volatilities (Figure 12), which is intuitive. The precise exposure depends on 
the floor and ceiling levels relative to the current price (Figure 13), and on the degree of risk 
sharing (downside and upside proportions for different layers). 
There are several implicit assumptions behind our analytical framework. (i) The arrangements 
are perpetual American call or put options, and a perpetual series of cash flows, viewed in 
continuous time.  Real arrangements may not perpetual, so both the options and the cash flows 
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would have to be reformatted as perpetuals less forward start options8, especially for shorter-
term arrangements.  This may not be a significant problem for 60 year arrangements when 
discount rates are high.  (ii) Parameter values such as interest rates, yield, price volatility, price 
floors and ceilings are considered constant or deterministic. Relaxing some of these assumptions 
is an interesting extension.  (iii) Sometimes arrangements specify that the concession termination 
is based on a specified achieved internal rate of return, or cumulative net present value, or 
accumulated net cash flows. We do not focus on negotiated exit prices or for GEN or GOV 
determined exit timing. (iv) GEN facilities and arrangements ignore GOV creditability issues 
and unexpected failures or physical disasters. GEN arrangements are envisioned as enforceable, 
without credit or default risk for either party, and investments are irrevocable, immediate, and 
terms cannot be re-negotiated over time. (v) The framework models are viewed in continuous 
time whereas prices, minimum and maximum revenue compensations and payments are likely to 
occur in discrete time, which would have to be specified (and verified) in any practical 
arrangement.  (vi) We do not allow for operating costs that are not already deducted from the net 
price or net revenues, or for periodic maintenance requirements. (vii) The revenue stream ignores 
other possible real options such as project cancellation, downsizing, renegotiation, expansion and 
resale, dynamic pricing for times of usage, and extensions into other activities such as further 
arrangements with electricity customers, or retail activities for motorway operators. (viii) While 
the GEN arrangement cited herein concerns an electricity generating facility, other arrangements 
such as transportation, building and operating hospitals and educational establishments may not 
have clear objectives such as sharing revenue risks and benefits.  Suitably designed optional 
elements may incorporate some of the same, or conceivably completely different objectives.  
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VC is from EQ 6, based on an initial arrangement of the base case in Table 2, except that PL=4 and 
PH=15.6 (a costless collar when P=6) where the option coefficient AC11 holds when P<PL, and AC32 when 





VC (6) is based on an initial arrangement of the base case in Table 2, except for varying volatility, if PL=4 
and PH=15.6 (a costless collar when P=6).  The option coefficients -AC21 =AC22 only when P=6, but the 
negative call value increases at a faster rate than the put option coefficient as volatility increases past 
25%, so the collar arrangement is lower than the PV without the option coefficients at higher levels of 
volatility.   
 
 
P 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
K 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
σ 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
r 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
δ 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
PL 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
PH 15.60250975 15.60251 15.60251 15.60251 15.60251 15.60251 15.60251 15.60251 15.60251 15.60251 15.60251
OUTPUT
VC 100.0000 107.6794 125.5975 150.0000 174.8382 197.7661 218.0526 235.4383 249.8382 261.4962 271.1008
VC PV 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 150.0000 200.0000 250.0000 300.0000 350.0000 390.0627 390.0627 390.0627
P/δ 0.0025 50.0000 100.0000 150.0000 200.0000 250.0000 300.0000 350.0000 400.0000 450.0000 500.0000
β1 1.7369 1.7369 1.7369 1.7369 1.7369 1.7369 1.7369 1.7369 1.7369 1.7369 1.7369
β2 -0.7369 -0.7369 -0.7369 -0.7369 -0.7369 -0.7369 -0.7369 -0.7369 -0.7369 -0.7369 -0.7369
P 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
VC 100.0000003 107.68 125.60 150.00 174.84 197.77 218.05 235.44 249.84 261.50 271.10
VC PV 100.0000000 100.00 100.00 150.00 200.00 250.00 300.00 350.00 390.06 390.06 390.06
AC11*P^β1 0.00 7.68 25.60 51.77 85.32 125.72 172.55 225.53 284.40 348.97 419.04
AC21*P^β1 0.00 -4.45 -14.83 -29.98 -49.42 -72.81 -99.94 -130.62 -164.72 -202.11 -242.70
AC22*P^β2 99547 67.37 40.42 29.98 24.25 20.58 17.99 16.06 14.55 13.34 12.35









0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
P
Sensitivity of Collar to Changes in P
VC VC PV
P 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
                 
σ 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75
r 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
δ 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
PL 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
PH 15.60 15.60 15.60 15.60 15.60 15.60 15.60 15.60 15.60 15.60 15.60 15.60 15.60 15.60 15.60 15.60
OUTPUT
VC 150.00 150.98 153.95 154.62 152.99 150.00 146.36 142.51 138.73 135.16 131.87 128.87 126.18 123.77 121.62 119.71
VC PV 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00
P/δ 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00
β1 28.79 6.18 3.37 2.45 2.00 1.74 1.57 1.45 1.37 1.30 1.25 1.22 1.19 1.16 1.14 1.13
β2 -27.79 -5.18 -2.37 -1.45 -1.00 -0.74 -0.57 -0.45 -0.37 -0.30 -0.25 -0.22 -0.19 -0.16 -0.14 -0.13
AC11*P^β1 207392.90 107.74 65.62 59.62 55.77 51.77 47.58 43.41 39.42 35.70 32.30 29.23 26.48 24.03 21.85 19.91
σ 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75
VC 150.00 150.98 153.95 154.62 152.99 150.00 146.36 142.51 138.73 135.16 131.87 128.87 126.18 123.77 121.62 119.71
AC21*P^β1 0.00 -0.09 -2.71 -9.61 -19.23 -29.98 -40.87 -51.32 -61.04 -69.89 -77.86 -84.96 -91.26 -96.84 -101.78 -106.14
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VC (6) is based on an initial arrangement of the base case in Table 2, except for varying the interest rate, 
when PL=4 and PH=15.6 (a costless collar) with P=6.  The option coefficients AC21 and AC22 hold when 
PL<P<PH.  The collar arrangement is compared to the PV without the option coefficients.  The PV is not 
affected by changes in the interest rate because the cash flows are uncertain, and so divided by the 




The VC (6) is based on an initial arrangement of the base case in Table 2, except for varying the yield, 
while PL=4 and PH=15.6 (a costless collar) with P=6.  The option coefficients AC21 and AC22 hold when 
PL<P<PH.  The collar arrangement is compared to the PV without the option coefficients.  
 
R 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
K 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
σ 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
r 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12
δ 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
RL 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
RH 15.6025 15.6025 15.6025 15.6025 15.6025 15.6025 15.6025 15.6025 15.6025
OUTPUT
VC 150.0000 130.5213 116.8992 106.4925 98.0693 90.9932 84.9035 79.5776 74.8664
VC PV 150.0000 150.0000 150.0000 150.0000 150.0000 150.0000 150.0000 150.0000 150.0000
R/δ 150.0000 150.0000 150.0000 150.0000 150.0000 150.0000 150.0000 150.0000 150.0000
β1 1.7369 1.6498 1.5773 1.5168 1.4661 1.4234 1.3871 1.3560 1.3291
β2 -0.7369 -0.9698 -1.2173 -1.4768 -1.7461 -2.0234 -2.3071 -2.5960 -2.8891
AC11*R^β1 51.7673 52.2348 51.8947 50.9631 49.6363 48.0715 46.3841 44.6542 42.9348
AC21*P^β1 -29.98 -36.74 -43.46 -49.93 -56.02 -61.68 -66.88 -71.63 -75.97










0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12
r
Collar Value as Function of Interest Rate
VC VC PV
R 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
K 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
σ 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
r 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
δ 0.001 0.005 0.010 0.015 0.020 0.025 0.030 0.035 0.040
RL 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
RH 15.6025 15.6025 15.6025 15.6025 15.6025 15.6025 15.6025 15.6025 15.6025
OUTPUT
VC 211.2132 203.8229 194.7555 185.9980 177.6648 169.8476 162.6112 155.9919 150.0000
VC PV 6000.0000 1200.0000 600.0000 400.0000 300.0000 240.0000 200.0000 171.4286 150.0000
R/δ 6000.0000 1200.0000 600.0000 400.0000 300.0000 240.0000 200.0000 171.4286 150.0000
β1 1.0141 1.0730 1.1515 1.2358 1.3256 1.4209 1.5214 1.6268 1.7369
β2 -1.2621 -1.1930 -1.1115 -1.0358 -0.9656 -0.9009 -0.8414 -0.7868 -0.7369
AC11*R^β1 112.7695 105.3989 96.3567 87.6251 79.3185 71.5287 64.3202 57.7296 51.7673
AC21*P^β1 -5800.59 -1009.49 -420.60 -231.56 -142.23 -92.50 -62.25 -42.85 -29.98
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At P=0, the GEN would have lost -150 without the Min P guarantee and RO, but instead loses -50.
At P=16, the GEN would have gained 400-150=250 without the ceiling ceded to the GOV, but instead gains 100.
Assumes the GOV has ceded control over a valuable monopoly, so GOV profit deducts the PV at all P (customers lose).
ACTIVE facility is sold to GEN at fair value P/δ when P=6 and
Government (GOV) guarantees a minimum P of 4 and receives all P over 15.60.
At P=6 and the other parameter values, -call=put for a "costless collar",
so the combined "profit" over the fair value of the GEN and GOV is 0.








0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
P
Risk Sharing as Function of P
GOV Profit GEN + GOV GEN Profit
GOV Profit 0.0000 -0.9847 -3.9474 -4.6230 -2.9945 0.0000 3.6443 7.4881 11.2679 14.8399 18.1348 21.1279 23.8210 26.2300 28.3776 30.2893
GEN + GOV 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
GEN Profit 0.0000 0.9847 3.9474 4.6230 2.9945 0.0000 -3.6443 -7.4881 -11.2679 -14.8399 -18.1348 -21.1279 -23.8210 -26.2300 -28.3776 -30.2893
Interpretation
At σ=.01, the call and put for both the GEN and GOV would have been of little value, when P=6.
At σ=.75, the call would be worth 106.14 for the GOV (and -106.4 for the GEN), while the put would be worth -75.85 for the GOV.
So with these values, the GEN would welcome P volatility below 25%, and the GOV benefit from higher volatility.
ACTIVE facility is sold to GEN at fair value P/δ when
Government (GOV) guarantees a minimum P of 4 and receives all P over 15.60.
At P=6 and the other parameter values, -call=put for a "costless collar",










0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75
Price Volatility
Risk Sharing as Function of P Volatility





Figure 6b   
Volatility Effect on Risk Sharing (Ac11) when P=2 
 
            
 
 
Figure 6c   
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Assumes the GOV has ceded control over a valuable monopoly, so GOV profit deducts the PV when P=6.
ACTIVE facility is sold to GEN at fair value P/δ when P=6 and
Government (GOV) guarantees a minimum P of 4 and receives all P over 15.60, interest rate is 4%.
At P=6 and the other parameter values, -CALL=PUT for a "costless collar",
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Risk Sharing as Function of Interest Rate
GOV Profit GEN + GOV GEN Profit
Assumes the GOV has ceded control over a valuable monopoly, so GOV profit deducts the PV when P=6.
ACTIVE facility is sold to GEN at fair value P/δ when P=6 and
Government (GOV) guarantees a minimum P of 4 and receives all P over 15.60, interest rate is 4%.
At P=6 and the other parameter values, -CALL=PUT for a "costless collar",
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Assumes the GOV has ceded control over a valuable monopoly, so GOV profit deducts the PV when P=6.
ACTIVE facility is sold to GEN at fair value P/δ when P=6 and δ is 4%. Base case is
GOV guarantees a minimum R of 4 and receives all R over 15.60, interest rate is 4%.
At P=6 and the other parameter values, -CALL=PUT for a "costless collar",
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At σ=.01, the CALL and PUT for both the GEN and GOV would have been of little value, when P=6 when there is a floor only.
At σ=.75, the CALL would be worth 46.93 for the GOV (and -46.93 for the GEN), while the PUT would be worth -75.85 for the GOV.
So with these values, the GEN would welcome P volatility especially around 45%.
Assumes the monopoly over which the GOV cedes control is of no value to the GOV.
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Using Table 2 parameter values, except that floors are 3.5, 4 and ceilings 10, 10.5, risk sharing is .25, .5 
on the downside and .5, .25 on the upside, calculated from Table 5 and 6 equations. Note that the 
layered collar values are based on escalating regimes I when P=2, II when P=4, III when P=6 to 10, V 
when P is 12+. 
                                                                                   Figure 12 
 
P 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
VC 40.26 101.91 138.24 173.03 205.68 223.71 240.37 256.12 271.23
Regime I 40.26 51.90 63.14 74.03 84.60 94.85 104.81 114.49 123.89
Regime II 64.62 101.91 139.12 178.27 219.66 263.33 309.25 357.37 407.63
Regime III 67.24 101.91 138.24 173.03 205.68 236.08 264.20 290.08 313.77
Regime IV 6.21 88.66 135.85 172.96 205.68 236.05 265.00 293.02 320.39
Regime V 54.72 125.33 160.35 185.20 205.63 223.71 240.37 256.12 271.23
OPTION
Regime I -0.3683 -1.2276 -2.4826 -4.0918 -6.0289 -8.2750 -10.8156 -13.6389 -16.7351
Regime II -10.3790 1.9093 14.1242 28.2678 44.6558 63.3256 84.2457 107.3663 132.6345
Regime III 17.2422 1.9093 -11.7594 -26.9745 -44.3193 -63.9249 -85.8006 ######## ########
Regime IV ######## -86.3448 -64.1494 -52.0360 -44.3193 -38.9514 -35.0015 -31.9819 -29.6102








2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
P
LAYERED COLLAR as Function of Price
σ 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60
VC P=6 149.95 148.38 145.39 141.86 138.24 134.76 131.54 128.60 125.97 123.63 121.56 119.74
Regime I 65.24 72.4539 70.0722 66.6964 63.1424 59.6974 56.4875 53.5647 50.9410 48.6072 46.5428 44.7224
Regime II 178.33 154.2156 147.8906 143.2465 139.1242 135.3753 131.9839 128.9439 126.2401 123.8493 121.7427 119.8903
Regime III 149.95 148.3801 145.3898 141.8576 138.2406 134.7636 131.5354 128.6009 125.9694 123.6301 121.5616 119.7382
Regime IV 46.35 129.6802 137.7815 137.8488 135.8506 133.2411 130.5319 127.9328 125.5306 123.3549 121.4074 119.6759
Regime V 69.59 153.9854 162.2168 162.3256 160.3461 157.7465 155.0432 152.4479 150.0483 147.8745 145.9284 144.1979
OPTION
Regime I -0.3824 6.8289 4.4472 1.0714 -2.4826 -5.9276 -9.1375 -12.0603 -14.6840 -17.0178 -19.0822 -20.9026
Regime II 53.3304 29.2156 22.8906 18.2465 14.1242 10.3753 6.9839 3.9439 1.2401 -1.1507 -3.2573 -5.1097
Regime III -0.0476 -1.6199 -4.6102 -8.1424 -11.7594 -15.2364 -18.4646 -21.3991 -24.0306 -26.3699 -28.4384 -30.2618
Regime IV -153.6480 -70.3198 -62.2185 -62.1513 -64.1494 -66.7589 -69.4681 -72.0672 -74.4694 -76.6451 -78.5926 -80.3241
Regime V -155.4059 -71.0146 -62.7832 -62.6744 -64.6539 -67.2535 -69.9568 -72.5521 -74.9517 -77.1255 -79.0716 -80.8021
VC P=2 40.62 40.79 40.93 40.74 40.26 39.57 38.77 37.94 37.12 36.34 35.61 34.95
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Using Table 2 parameter values, except that floors are 3.5, 4 and ceilings 10, 10.5, risk sharing is .25, .5 
on the downside and .5, .25 on the upside, calculated from Table 5 and 6 equations. The layered collar 




VC ∆ is the middle row of (16), showing that the ACTIVE project with a collar when P=6 becomes less 
sensitive to changes in P as the floor increases, but the floor ∆ from (17) becomes more important as 












PL 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
VC ∆ 12.62 12.28 11.85 11.33 10.72 10.03 9.27 8.44 7.53
∆AC22*P^β2 17.55 23.67 29.25 34.48 39.44 44.19 48.76 53.18 57.47
∆AC32*P^β2 17.5528 23.6654 29.2540 34.4827 39.4414 44.1863 48.7556 53.1765 57.4699
Ceiling Deltas         
∆AC11*P^β1 0.1365 0.1365 0.1365 0.1365 0.1365 0.1365 0.1365 0.1365 0.1365
∆AC21*P^β1 0.1365 0.1365 0.1365 0.1365 0.1365 0.1365 0.1365 0.1365 0.1365
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Basic Inputs and Outputs for COLLAR ARRANGEMENT 
 
 
The COLLAR VC is from (6), power parameters from (4), the option coefficients from (11), the collar delta 
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VC 138.3688  6
VC PV 150.0000 IF(B3<B8,B8/B6,IF(B3>B9,B9/B6,B3/B7)) 6
P/δ 150.0000 B3/B7  
β1 1.7369 0.5-(B6-B7)/(B5^2)+SQRT(((B6-B7)/(B5^2)-0.5)^2 + 2*B6/(B5^2)) 4
β2 -0.7369 0.5-(B6-B7)/(B5^2)-SQRT(((B6-B7)/(B5^2)-0.5)^2 + 2*B6/(B5^2)) 4
AC11*P^β1 40.1361 B21*(B3^B14)  
AC21*P^β1 -41.6129 B22*(B3^B14)  
AC22*P^β2 29.9818 B23*(B3^B15)  
AC32*P^β2 -117.2670 B24*(B3^B15)  
VC 138.3688 B12+B17+B18  
AC11 1.7862 (B9/(B9^B14)-B8/(B8^B14))*(B25/B27) 11
AC21 -1.8520 (B9/(B9^B14))*(B25/B27) 11
AC22 112.2797 (-B8/(B8^B15))*(B26/B27) 11
AC32 -439.16 (B9/(B9^B15)-B8/(B8^B15))*(B26/B27) 11
[      ] -0.0400 (B6*B15-B6-B7*B15) 11
(     ) -0.0400 (B6*B14-B6-B7*B14) 11
{      } 0.0040 (B14-B15)*B6*B7 11
VC IF(B3<B8,B8/B6+B21*(B3^B14),IF(B3>B9,B9/B6+B24*(B3^B15),B3/B7+B22*(B3^B14)+B23*(B3^B15)))
ODE 0.0000 0.5*(B5^2)*(B3^2)*B31+(B6-B7)*B3*B30-B6*B11+MIN(MAX(B8,B3),B9) 5
VC ∆ 9.2711 IF(B3<B8,B14*B21*(B3^(B14-1)),IF(B3>B9,B15*B24*(B3^(B15-1)),1/B7+B14*B22*(B3^(B14-1))+B15*B23*(B3^(B15-1)))) 16
VC Γ -0.4136 IF(B3<B8,B14*(B14-1)*B21*(B3^(B14-2)),IF(B3>B9,B15*(B15-1)*B24*(B3^(B15-2)),B14*(B14-1)*B22*(B3^(B14-2))+B15*(B15-1)*B23*(B3^(B15-2))))
Floor Deltas  
∆AC11*P^β1 -0.6703 -((1-B14)*(B8^(-B14))*(B25/B27)) 17
∆AC22*P^β2 48.7556 -(1-B15)*B8^(-B15)*(B26/B27) 17
∆AC32*P^β2 48.7556 -(1-B15)*B8^(-B15)*(B26/B27) 17
Ceiling Deltas  
∆AC11*P^β1 0.1365 (1-B14)*B9^(-B14)*(B25/B27) 18
∆AC21*P^β1 0.1365 (1-B14)*(B9^(-B14)*(B25/B27)) 18











Switch Option Coefficients for the With-Collar Model for Variations in Floor and Cap Levels  
                     
            
              
      
Using the baseline data, the coefficients 11 21 22 32, , ,C C C CA A A A  are evaluated from (11) for the various 
indicated LP  and HP  values.      
            
            
Panel A: AC11 Panel B: AC21
PH PL=0 PL=1 PL=2 PL=3 PL=4 PL=0 PL=1 PL=2 PL=3 PL=4
10 0.0000 8.2537 4.2116 2.6454 1.7862 -1.8520 -1.8520 -1.8520 -1.8520 -1.8520
20 0.0000 8.9944 4.9523 3.3862 2.5270 -1.1112 -1.1112 -1.1112 -1.1112 -1.1112
50 0.0000 9.5400 5.4979 3.9317 3.0726 -0.5656 -0.5656 -0.5656 -0.5656 -0.5656
100 0.0000 9.7663 5.7241 4.1580 3.2988 -0.3394 -0.3394 -0.3394 -0.3394 -0.3394
200 0.0000 9.9020 5.8599 4.2937 3.4346 -0.2036 -0.2036 -0.2036 -0.2036 -0.2036
500 0.0000 10.0020 5.9599 4.3937 3.5345 -0.1037 -0.1037 -0.1037 -0.1037 -0.1037
1000 0.0000 10.0435 6.0013 4.4352 3.5760 -0.0622 -0.0622 -0.0622 -0.0622 -0.0622
Infinity 0.0000 10.1057 6.0635 4.4974 3.6382 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Panel C: AC22 Panel D: AC32
PH PL=0 PL=1 PL=2 PL=3 PL=4 PL=0 PL=1 PL=2 PL=3 PL=4
10 0.000 10.106 33.685 68.123 112.280 -551 -541 -518 -483 -439
20 0.000 10.106 33.685 68.123 112.280 -1838 -1828 -1804 -1770 -1726
50 0.000 10.106 33.685 68.123 112.280 -9027 -9017 -8994 -8959 -8915
100 0.000 10.106 33.685 68.123 112.280 -30090 -30080 -30057 -30022 -29978
200 0.000 10.106 33.685 68.123 112.280 -100299 -100289 -100265 -100231 -100187
500 0.000 10.106 33.685 68.123 112.280 -492596 -492586 -492562 -492528 -492484
1000 0.000 10.106 33.685 68.123 112.280 -1641948 -1641938 -1641914 -1641880 -1641836
Infinity 0.000 10.106 33.685 68.123 112.280 Infinity Infinity Infinity Infinity Infinity
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Table 4 
     Costless Collars 
 
Based on Table 2 base parameter values except for changing PL, the PH is calculated as that 
ceiling which results in the negative written call equal to the held put for Regime II, when P is 
between PL and PH. 
PL 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
PH 409.48 157.47 79.93 47.24 30.74 21.37 15.60 11.82 9.22
AC21*Pβ1 -2.70 -5.46 -8.99 -13.25 -18.19 -23.78 -29.98 -36.79 -44.18
AC22*Pβ2 2.70 5.46 8.99 13.25 18.19 23.78 29.98 36.79 44.18
